Russian invasion has reshaped European defense policy for the long term.
In an article published two days after Russian President Vladimir Putin dispatched his armed forces to Ukraine, the state news outlet RIA Novosti presumed that the country would win. The end of Western dominance, the breaking of ties between the United States and continental Europe, and the return of Russia to its proper “space and place” in the world were all lauded as part of this “new era.”
As the battle continues, celebrating the emergence of an unified Russian World to unify Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia appears premature at best. The story was quickly taken down by RIA Novosti. But the author was correct in one point: Putin’s invasion appears to be affecting the world order, albeit not in the way he intended.
Defending Europe’s metrics have been shattered in cities from Berlin to London, as well as the Baltic towns such as Tallinn. A large-scale conflict is no longer unimaginable, and governments are rethinking their spending, purchasing, and fighting strategies.
Rather than breaking away from the United States, NATO’s European members have remained steadfast. Rather from shrinking to its pre-expansion size in the 1990s, as Putin wanted before his invasion, the alliance is beefing up its defenses. To dissuade any future Kremlin decision to widen the war, NATO has sent an additional 3,000 troops, as well as helicopters, tanks, and fighter jets, to its eastern flank.
“No matter how this war turns out — and as cynical as it sounds now — historians will say that Putin’s attack on Ukraine gave Europe the time it needed to recover so it could confront Russia and, further down the road, China,” explained General Richard Barrons, a former commander of the U.K.’s Joint Forces Command. “Ukraine is paying a high price to buy us time.”
What Europe will do with that time will be the great question. Germany’s pledge to spend an additional $110 billion is only the most visible example of military escalation, one that has ramifications for Europe’s power balance as well as relations with Russia.
Others are increasing defense spending as well, particularly the three small Baltic states, which have long raised concerns about Putin. They’re also requesting permanent bases and long-range anti-aircraft weapons from NATO, though it’s unclear whether they’ll obtain them.
None of this signals a restoration to European stability, but a recognition of its absence. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a “post-imperial, post-colonial land grab,” according to Fiona Hill, the former senior director for European and Russian affairs at the US National Security Council. “We’re setting a precedent for the future if we let this happen.”
Those extra billions can either be spent wisely or not at all. NATO’s unity and determination may weaken as the first shock of the war and inspirational influence of the Ukrainian struggle fades.
Putin may still be able to accomplish some of his objectives, and there’s a good chance he’ll choose isolation for Russia — and lasting instability for Ukraine and Europe — over admitting his error. If he loses, his political survival may be jeopardized.
“It is still a race,” according to David Shlapak, senior defense researcher at the Rand Corporation, a U.S. think tank. “It is a race where they have motivated us to start running, but it is still a competition that neither side is pre-ordained to win or lose. There are a lot of cards that still need to be played on the NATO side to figure that out.”
Nonetheless, the Russian military has been mauled, and the country’s reserve of precision-guided missiles has been decimated. According to Michael Mazarr, a former special assistant to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, barring a catastrophic escalation of the current conflict, this should make a Russian war of choice with NATO less likely in the future than it was before Feb. 24.
Putin’s generals will have learnt lessons, regrouped, and rearmed in three or five years, he added, but they will be hampered by sanctions that limit access to technologies and funding. When allies meet later this week, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan told reporters that allies would seek to tighten and expand sanctions on Russia.
According to Mazarr, this is where the most concerning transformation in Europe’s security order emerges. According to him, maintaining the status quo requires achieving a mutual understanding between great powers. Even after the 1960s, the Soviet Union was able to do this, but not with Putin’s Russia. And, no matter how wise NATO’s post-Cold War expansion was, such an agreement may now be unattainable.
Concerns in Washington have been raised about whether China may assist Russia in evading sanctions and reequipment, a move that would invite more US sanctions and hasten the world’s redistribution into economic and geopolitical blocs. China has denied that Moscow has asked for assistance, and there are few indicators that it will do so.
Defense officials in front-line NATO countries are focusing less on Russian military blunders in Ukraine and more on evidence that Putin can act on false assumptions.
“Russia wants to restore this Soviet type bloc of states in this part of the world,” according to Brigadier General Riho Ühtegi, commander of the Estonian Defense League, a volunteer reserve of 19,000 adults and 6,000 cadets. “Maybe we are not next – there is Moldova and still Georgia, there’s a frozen conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and there’s Kazakhstan — there are many places Russia has to do something. But we have to be ready.”
Since the invasion of Ukraine began, Ühtegi said he’s had roughly 1,000 applications, half of which are from women. He also intends to purchase more anti-tank weapons and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, which the Ukrainians have successfully deployed.
Since circumstances have shown Rand wrong, Ühtegi is confident that the Baltics will not be involved in another conflict. Without a doubt, Russian soldiers would rush to the capitals, but the conflict would be waged behind Russian lines and in cities, just as it was in Ukraine. It would not be a foregone conclusion.
“If NATO forces took a while to come they would not be coming to occupied territory,” said Ühtegi. “They would be coming to a war zone.”
In capitals further west and south, the Baltics were generally considered as alarmist, if not paranoid, because they feared Russia represented a military threat. Despite how implausible it may appear that Russia will take on NATO, Lithuania’s prime minister joined the country’s paramilitary unit this month. The invasion of Ukraine is forcing a major rethink on security in the Baltic States and Poland, but not so much in the rest of Europe.
In addition to the new fund, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz pledged to raise annual defense spending to at least 2% of GDP, up from 1.53% last year – a shortfall that has been a point of conflict with previous US administrations. Based on current German GDP, this would amount to a $21 billion annual increase, or over a third of Russia’s entire defense spending.
According to Barrons, the retired British general who is now co-chairman of Universal Defence & Security Solutions, a strategy consultancy, Putin’s invasion had such an impact across Europe because everyone suddenly understood that distance offers less protection in an age of hypersonic weapons and cyber, information, and economic warfare.
“It’s a 90 minute journey,” he said, “and there are cruise missiles over London.”
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